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Getting Class
LAURA T. KESSLERt

Gender-based
economic inequality has been a
longstanding concern of feminist legal theory, particularly
as it affects middle-class women. Yet much legal feminist
literature remains uninterested in class analysis. The
reasons are rooted in law as much as in feminism: Legal
scholars are drawn from a relatively narrow demographic
group; reaching beyond our own perspective is often
difficult. American constitutionalism addresses economic
inequality weakly and indirectly.' As scholars and lawyers
working in this system, the tools for the job are often
unavailable. Neoliberalism and other poststructuralist
theories in law often render class analyses passe, perhaps
even dangerous in the tenure process. Finally, feminism
has its own complicated relationship with structuralism.
Most basically, feminism rejects the idea that mainstream
economic relations are the root of all social relations. 2 This
rejection is especially strong in American legal feminism. 3
How, then, can a focus on class build on and add to feminist
legal theory projects? This Essay is intended to initiate a
conversation around that question, more than to provide
fully formed theories, strategies, or answers.

t Professor of Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law;
kesslerl@law.utah.edu. Many thanks to Martha McCluskey and Athena Mutua
for inviting me to be part of the ClassCrits Working Group, to Martha Ertman
and Martha McCluskey for their thoughtful comments on earlier versions of
this Essay, and to Mary Ann Call for research assistance. All rights reserved
December 26, 2008.
1. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS 4-5, 105-08 (2004);
Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the
Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. FEMINISM 1, 3-4 (2008).

2. See Iris M. Young, Socialist Feminism and the Limits of Dual Systems
Theory, SOCIALIST REV., Mar.-June 1980, at 169, 169-88.
3. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the
State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515, 516 (1982).
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I come to the ClassCrits project as someone interested
in the devaluation of domestic labor within the law, one of
the central means by which gender-based economic
inequality is perpetuated. Although a significant body of
legal feminist work addresses this problem, certain legal
feminist theories and strategies can be fairly critiqued for
not taking class differences seriously enough. By placing
economically privileged, white, heterosexual women at the
center of the analysis, such theories and strategies discount
the experiences of many women and men. The first part of
this Essay briefly provides some examples of this failing.
The second part explores five possible strategies for
overcoming insufficient attention to class in legal feminism,
taking an intersectional approach. I choose my examples
from employment discrimination and family law, but the
analysis may well apply to other areas.
I. EXAMPLES OF INSUFFICIENT ATTENTION TO CLASS WITHIN
LEGAL FEMINIST PROJECTS ON THE WORKPLACE

The workplace has been a major focus of legal feminist
advocacy and theorizing since the Second Wave. Broadly,
legal feminists have focused their energy on three sources of
gender inequality at work: sex stereotyping, the tension
between market and family work, and sexualized violence
in the workplace. These efforts have resulted in a number of
positive legal developments, most significantly the passage
of Title VII, 4 the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 5 and the
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 6 and the judicial
recognition of sexual harassment under Title VII.7
Yet economically privileged workers have received a
disproportionate share of the benefits of legal reform. For

4. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 241,
253-66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, 2000e-17 (2000 & Supp.

2005)).

5. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)
(2000)) (amending Title VII to include pregnancy-based discrimination as a
prohibited form of sex discrimination).
6. Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654
(2000 & Supp. 2005)).
7. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986).

2008]

GETTING CLASS

917

example, the FMLA covers only employers with fifty or
more employees 8 and employees who work, on average,
more than twenty-five hours a week in a year. 9 These
limitations effectively exclude millions of less economically
privileged workers, who are more likely to work in small
firms, to work part-time, and to have multiple employers in
a given year. Most glaring, the FMLA's provision of unpaid
family leave renders its protections out of reach of all but
the most privileged workers. 10 Women most likely to take
family leave are married, have a graduate school education,
earn higher incomes, and are salaried workers. 11 Surely we
cannot lay the blame for such partial victories on legal
feminism, but overcoming our political and legal system's
bias in favor of powerful economic interests may require
more serious attention to class than we have been in the
habit of giving.
For example, in an effort to address the tension
between market and family work, some prominent legal
feminist scholarship has pushed for meaningful part-time
work and flexible work schedules.12 This emphasis on less
work, rather than, for example, affordable child care,
assumes a person of sufficient economic means to live on a
part-time salary and/or the presence of a second
breadwinner. But marriage rates are significantly lower
among the poor than among the middle class, 13 among
African-Americans compared with whites, 14 and, of course,

8. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(a) (2002).
9. Specifically, an employee is covered only if (s)he works "at least 1,250
hours

. .

.

during

the

. .

.

12-month

period" immediately

preceding

commencement of FMLA leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A)(ii) (2000).
10. See David Cantor et al., Balancing the Needs of Familiesand Employers:
Family and Medical Leave Surveys, § 2.1.3, at 2-9 (2000) (Westat report funded
by the Dep't of Labor) (on file with author).
11. Id.

12. See, e.g., JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK
CONFLICT AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 112, 237, 291 n.23 (2000); Joan Williams &
Cynthia Thomas Calvert, Balanced Hours: Effective Part-Time Policies for
Washington Law Firms: The Project for Attorney Retention, 8 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 357 passim (2002).
13. See Andrew J. Cherlin, American Marriage in the Early Twenty-First
Century, FUTURE CHILD., Fall 2005, at 37-38.
14. Id. at 38-39.
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among same-sex couples. When we consider these
demographic data, a major area of feminist theorizing about
women's economic inequality appears to miss the mark. 15
More generally, the emphasis on wage work as the most
promising path to women's liberation 16 (rather than on a
more robust welfare state, for example) also potentially
underacknowledges the problem that safe, well-paid,
fulfilling work may not be available for many women.
Looking to wage work as a promising source of equality and
freedom is a project worthy of feminist support. But
emphasizing wage work to the exclusion of other strategies
for
addressing
gender-based
economic
inequality
underappreciates the oppressive nature of wage work for
many workers.
Work has meant equal citizenship primarily for white,
economically privileged people; it has been a significant
source of exploitation for women and men of color and
lower-class whites, who have historically occupied the lower
rungs of our wage economy. Moreover, the new economy
and technological innovation, in which some labor and
employment law scholars see liberatory potential, 17 are
often deployed in ways that reinforce status-based
hierarchies. They have given professional workers
relatively more autonomy than less privileged workers, as
well as a higher stake in the work enterprise, while
delivering to the rest of the workforce mechanized,
outsourced, and contingent work characterized by increased
monitoring and control.' 8 These oppressive effects of
15. This critique is gaining some momentum. See, e.g., Lucy Williams, Poor
Women's Work Experiences: Gaps in the Work/Family' Discussion, in LABOUR
LAW, WORK, AND FAMILY: CRITICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 195 (Joanne
Conaghan & Kerry Rittich eds., 2005); Nancy E. Dowd, Bringing the Margin to
the Center: Comprehensive Strategies for Work/Family Policies, 73 U. CIN. L.
REV. 433, 447-49 (2004); Michael Selmi & Naomi Cahn, Women in the
Workplace: Which Women, Which Agenda?, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 7
passim (2006).
16. See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1886-92

(2000); Michael Selmi, Care, Work, and the Road to Equality: A Commentary on
Fineman and Williams, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1557, 1558 (2001).
17. See, e.g., KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT
REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE passim (2004).
18. See RICHARD SENNETT, THE CORROSION OF CHARACTER: THE PERSONAL
CONSEQUENCES OF WORK IN THE NEW CAPITALISM 57-59 (1998).
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modern work arrangements have been underexplored in
some feminist legal theorizing on the workplace. 19
Emphasizing wage work as the most promising path to
economic equality also implicitly suggests that childrearing,
domestic labor, and the home and family are primarily
sources of oppression. Again, this places the experience of
white, economically privileged, heterosexual women at the
center of the analysis. Although family caregiving may
simply seem to support patriarchy, a closer examination
reveals that it can also be a deeply and complexly
subversive practice. For example, caregiving work within
African-American families and communities is imbued with
significant positive political meaning that derives from
blacks' historical experience of discrimination with regard
to family life and reproduction, including the sexual
economy of slavery, the eugenics movement, and
contemporary welfare policies aimed at influencing poor
black women's reproductive decisions. 20 Along the same
lines, gay men and lesbians have long suffered statesponsored
discrimination
with
regard
to
their
reproduction, sexuality, and family life, as demonstrated
by laws denying them sexual privacy, marriage, adoption,
and custody rights. 21 When considered in the context of
these histories, family care work within a range of
minority communities can be understood, at least in part,
as an act of resistance to oppression. This vision contrasts
with the "cult of true womanhood" 22 rejected by many
white feminists, in which family care work is defined as
being primarily at odds with liberation.
The recent focus on sexual pleasure within certain
cutting-edge strands of legal feminism is another area that
may benefit from more attention to class. This scholarship

19. In contrast, legal feminists have spent a great deal of energy debating
whether it is wise to value unpaid family labor through welfare, employment,
divorce, and other laws, given the risk that such strategies will reinforce
traditional gender roles. See Laura T. Kessler, Transgressive Caregiving, 33
FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1, 49-70 (2005). My point is that legal feminism may benefit
from subjecting paid labor to this type of critical analysis too.
20. See id. at 12-27.
21. See id. at 27-44.
22. See Barbara Welter, The Cult of True Womanhoo& 1820-1860, 18 AM. Q.
151 (1966).
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suggests that legal feminism has unduly focused on
dependency and reproduction to the exclusion of sexuality. 23
Similarly, it is argued that legal feminist scholarship on
sexual violence is inattentive to the pleasure producing
aspects of sexuality. A major target of this sex-positive
critique is sexual harassment law.
For example, certain prominent scholarship suggests
that sexual harassment law may constitute a form of
sexuality regulation. 24 According to this critique, sexual
harassment lawsuits represent a potential vehicle for
homophobia, what Janet Halley has termed "sexuality
harassment. ' 25 More broadly, the objection to sexual
harassment law is that it enforces a prudish, heteronormative
view of sexual desire. 26 Other feminist scholarship critiques
sexual harassment law from a liberal perspective. 27 For
example, Vicki Schultz argues that the law's focus on
individual wrongdoers and overtly sexual behavior hides
more serious problems of structural gender inequality in the
workplace. 28 Yet Schultz too worries about sexual harassment
law's dampening effects on sexual pleasure. 29 For example,
she suggests that sexual harassment law may go too far in
limiting potential sexual liaisons among employees in
workplaces demonstrating a high degree of gender
integration and equality.30 Exploring whether employers

23.

See, e.g., JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS:

How

AND WHY TO TAKE A

BREAK FROM FEMINISM 22-23 (2006); Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An
Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 187, 199, 202,
208 (2001); Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061 (2003).
24. See Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in LEFT LEGALISMILEFT
CRITIQUE 80 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002).
25. Id. at 80, 98-103.
26. Id. at 88-89; see also Franke, supra note 23, at 206.
27. See Schultz, supra note 23, passim.
28. Id. at 2132.
29. Id. at 2166-67 ("[We may have to allow people to engage in sexual
liaisons at work in order to find potential mates .... Yet the problem isn't
simply that rules against sexual conduct might pose a barrier to people forming
traditional sexual relationships that would extend outside the workplace. The
bigger problem is that such rules may pose barriers to people forming erotic and
other close connections that would occur primarily inside the workplace.").
30. Id. at 2174.
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should be subject to a lower risk of liability for sexual
harassment is part of the larger sex-positive project.
To be sure, these critiques are driven by legitimate
concerns about certain potentially problematic and
unintended effects of sexual harassment law. Moreover, the
legal feminists who have explored these questions are
hardly disciples of the Law and Economics movement.
Indeed, Schultz's scholarship on the workplace is singular
in its attention to the concerns of working class women and
men. Yet there are similarities between their thought on
these issues and neoliberal attacks on discrimination law.
Like neoliberalism, this strand of legal feminism holds an
optimistic view of workers' power, freedom, and autonomy.
It is also more or less committed to a restrained state.
These visions of work, and the appropriate role of the
state in protecting workers, are hard to square with the
experience of poor workers such as domestic servants, lowpaid service workers, and factory workers. Take, for
example, the following description by a labor organizer of
the work conditions at AgriProcessors, an Iowa
slaughterhouse and meat packing plant:
[J]uana . . . came to this rural corner of Iowa a year ago from
Guatemala. Since then, she has worked 10-to-12-hour night shifts, six
nights a week. Her cutting hand is swollen and deformed, but she has
no health insurance to have it checked. She works for wages, starting
at $6.25 an hour and stopping at $7 .... Juana and other employees at
AgriProcessors-they total about 800-... receive virtually no safety
training. This is an anomaly in an industry in which the tools are
designed to cut and grind through flesh and bones. In just one month
last summer, two young men required amputations; workers say there
have been others since. The chickens and cattle fly by at a steady clip
on metal hooks, and employees said they are berated for not working
fast enough. In addition, employees told of being asked to bribe
supervisors for better shifts and of being shortchanged on paychecks
31
regularly.

Certainly not all Juanas of the world are interchangeable, and
some otherwise incredibly marginalized workers may very
well see the workplace as a site of potential romantic
fulfillment, but my guess is that finding dates is not on the
top of Juana's list of priorities at work. Add to Juana's story
Supreme Court decisions tying employer liability for sexual

31. See Nathaniel Popper, In Iowa Meat Plant, Kosher 'Jungle'Breeds Fear,
Injury, Short Pay, FORWARD, May 26, 2006, at 1-2.
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harassment to a plaintiffs required use of any internal
complaint procedures, 32 research showing that women of
color are less likely than white women to report sexual
harassment, 33 and the low success rate of employment
discrimination plaintiffs in federal court, 34 and the sexpositive angle on women's liberation seems out of touch with
the plight of many workers. 35 And do sex panics motivate a
sufficient number of sexual harassment claims to roll back
sexual harassment law, especially when more straightforward,
less costly avenues for eradicating sexuality discrimination
could be developed? 36 The expansive, queer vision of desire
suggested by this area of feminist theorizing is important for
all of the reasons that paradigm-shifting work is so valuable.
32. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998);
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-08 (1998).
33. See Tanya Kateri Hern~ndez, A Critical Race Feminism Empirical
Research Project: Sexual Harassment & the Internal Complaints Black Box, 39
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 1255-57 (2006).
34. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment
Discrimination Cases in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. POL'Y
REV. 3, 3 (2009); Michael Selmi, Why are Employment Discrimination Cases So
Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 555 (2001).
35. To be fair, Schultz proposes that workplaces demonstrating persistent
structural gender discrimination, such as a segregated workforce, would be
exempt from her proposal to reign-in sexual harassment law. Indeed, under her
proposal, such employers would be subject to an even higher risk of liability for
sexual harassment than current law provides. See Schultz, supra note 23, at
2174-75. Although this workplace-specific test would go a long way toward
limiting the potentially harmful effects of this critique of sexual harassment
law, certain challenges remain. First, gender discrimination manifests in
complex and subtle ways even in apparently equal and integrated workplaces.
See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination:A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 passim (2001). Second, the common
intersectional experience of sexual harassment by women of color is not
explicitly accounted for in the proposal. For example, if Juana works side by
side with Latino immigrant workers under the supervision of another Latinoperhaps someone the white factory owners rewarded and promoted for
furthering their interests-and one of these men sexually harasses her, it is not
clear whether AgriProcessors would be subject to a higher or lower standard of
liability under Schultz's proposal. Schultz's forward-thinking proposal
represents a powerful challenge to the bifurcation within employment
discrimination law of sexual harassment and systemic, structural gender
discrimination. A deeper intersectional analysis could enrich the strategy she
articulates.
36. See, e.g., Employment Nondiscrimination Act, H.R. 2015, 110th Cong.
(April 24, 2007).
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Still, I worry that the workplace, which remains a site of
dependency and inequality for many people, is not the place
for the law to facilitate an exploration
of the sexiness of
37
subordination, at least just yet.
II. EXAMPLES OF INSUFFICIENT ATTENTION TO CLASS
WITHIN LEGAL FEMINIST PROJECTS ON THE FAMILY

In the 1980s, legal feminists developed a major critique
of the growing dominance of a formal equality framework in
divorce law. In particular, they questioned rules that
allocate marital property equally in most instances and
provide little or no ongoing spousal support on the theory
that independent, faultless parties should have a clean
break. Legal feminists, most prominently Martha Fineman,
articulated how the no-fault system unjustly disregards the
economic dependencies that develop as a result of women's
disproportionate role in childbearing and childrearing, as
well as the effects of wage discrimination in the labor
market. 38 Fineman's analysis included both a focus on
family law and a structural critique of our country's
insufficiently robust welfare state.
Yet many critiques of divorce reform were more
narrowly focused on the problem of disappearing alimony
awards and other aspects of the no-fault system. 39 The
escape of the primary breadwinner's future earning capacity
under the no-fault regime surely hurts women economically.
Income is a major asset of most marriages. However, this
problem is less relevant to women of limited economic means
and women of color, who are less likely to ever be married
and who, if married, are unlikely to be married to a man
with the kind of job that would make a generous alimony
37. More generally, as legal feminism embarks on these promising new lines
of inquiry provoked by the success of queer legal theory in law, it may be worth
carefully considering which sites, institutions, and practices are best subject to
the sex-positive critique, and how queer theory might be integrated with the
insights of feminism, race theory, and materialism. This is a "convergentist
feminist" project. See HALLEY, supra note 23, at 26. No apologies.
38. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE
RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 39-51 (1991).
39. See, e.g., LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE
UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN
IN AMERICA 163-83 (1985).
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award a promising path to economic independence. 40 Along
the same lines, reviving the remedy of support in the divorce
same-sex couples denied
context offers essentially nothing to 41
the right of marriage or civil unions.
To provide a second family law example, many states
have expanded the definition of parent to include persons to
whom a child has bonded in a parental relationship but
with whom the child does not necessarily have a biological,
adoptive, or legal relationship. 42 Despite this progressive
trend toward recognizing a broader range of familial
relationships, courts and family law scholars across the
political spectrum seem to accept the prevailing legal rule
that a child shall not concurrently have more than two legal
parents. Yet children in lower income families, families of
color, and families with one or more gay or lesbian parent
are significantly more likely to have economic and
caregiving adults-what I call
emotional ties to multiple
"community parenting." 43
For example, the practice of "othermothering" is common
in many African-American communities. 44 Othermothers are
women who assist biological parents by sharing parenting
responsibilities. They can be but are not confined to such
blood relatives as grandmothers, sisters, aunts, cousins, or
40. For a fuller articulation of this critique, see Twila L. Perry, Alimony:
Race, Privilege, and Dependency in the Search for Theory, 82 GEO. L.J. 2481,
2493, 2497-99 (1994).
41. Same-sex couples have post-dissolution support rights through
marriage, civil unions, or domestic partnerships in just eight states. See In re
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub.
Health, 957 A.2d 407, 481-82 (Conn. 2008); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health,
798 N.E.2d 941, 969-70 (Mass. 2003); CAL. FAM CODE § 297.5 (West 2007); D.C.
CODE ANN.

§ 32-702 (LexisNexis

2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 457-A:6

(LexisNexis Supp. 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-31 (West Supp. 2008); Oregon
Family Fairness Act, ch. 99, 2007 Or. Laws, reprinted in OR. REV. STAT. tit. 11,
ch. 106 notes at § 9(1) (2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1204 (West Supp. 2007).
42. Compare William C. Duncan, "Don't Ever Take a Fence Down" The
"Functional"Definition of Family-DisplacingMarriage in Family Law, 3 J.L.
& FAM. STUD. 57, 77 (2001), with Peggy Cooper Davis, The Good Mother: A New
Look at Psychological Parent Theory, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 347,
360-62 (1996).
43. Laura T. Kessler, Community Parenting,24 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 47,
47, 53-59 (2007).
44. See Patricia Hill Collins, The Meaning of Motherhood in Black Culture
and Black Mother/DaughterRelationships, SAGE, Fall 1987, at 3, 4-5 (1987).
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supportive fictive kin. Along the same lines, although many
low-income men do not provide formal child support
payments, they often contribute to the support of their
children by spending time with them and by providing them
with gifts and necessities. 45 Conceptions of fatherhood that
focus primarily on a man's ability to financially support his
family in the form of earned wages obscure the extent to
which nonresidential fathers remain in children's lives in
minority and low income communities, along with other
biological and fictive kin.
Community parenting occurs in other contexts as well.
For example, more Americans than ever have grandparents
who are alive, 46 and there is evidence that ties between
grandparents and grandchildren have become stronger over
the past half century. 47 Moreover, research shows that
grandparents are more involved with their grandchildren
especially
maternal
parents
are
divorced,
when
grandparents, given the norm of maternal custody. As two
leading sociologists of the family note, "intergenerational
ties are often latent in the kinship system" until a crisis
occurs. 48 Thus, "far from uniformly destroying the bonds of
kinship, divorce appears to strengthen intergenerational
ties along the maternal line. As a result, children of
divorced parents may have stronger ties to some of their
grandparents than children from non-disrupted marriages
have to any of their grandparents." 49 The remarriage of a
parent does not appear to affect this increased contact
between grandchildren and their maternal grandparents

45. See KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN, MAKING ENDS MEET: How SINGLE

164-65 (1997); Jennifer F.
Hamer, The Fathers of "Fatherless"Black Children, 78 FAMs. Soc'Y 564, 569-70
(1997).
MOTHERS SURVIVE WELFARE AND Low-WAGE WORK

46. See Merril Silverstein & Jeffrey D. Long, Trajectories of Grandparents'
Perceived Solidarity with Adult Grandchildren:A Growth Curve Analysis over
23 Years, 60 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 912, 912 (1998).
47. See Chrystal C. Ramirez Barranti, The Grandparent/Grandchild
Relationship:Family Resource in an Era of Voluntary Bonds, 34 FAM. REL. 343,
343-44, 346-48 (1985).
48. ANDREW J. CHERLIN & FRANK F. FURSTENBERG, JR., THE NEW AMERICAN
GRANDPARENT 163-64 (1986).
49. Id. at 164.
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after divorce. The potential result is three or more adults
across households and generations who are substantially
involved in a child's life.
Similarly, lesbians and gay men often engage in care
practices involving social kin. 50 For example, a gay family of
choice may include lovers, ex-lovers, friends, co-parents,
gamete-donors, and children brought into the family through
adoption, foster care, prior heterosexual relationships, and
alternative reproduction. Like the tradition of othermothering
within the black community, gay families of choice are made
up of fluid networks that have different purposes-including
emotional support, economic cooperation, socialization,
reproduction, consumption, and sexuality-which overlap but
are not coterminous. And like the community parenting
practices in communities of color, biological fathers are
increasingly playing an active role in the parenting of
children of lesbian mothers,
becoming a "junior partner in
' 51
the parenting team.
These community parenting practices are obscured by
political and legal discourses surrounding divorce,
cohabitation, single-parenthood, and gay family rights that
conceive contemporary families only in relation to an
idealized, two-parent norm. In these discourses, modern
families are described as "broken" and "divorced."52
Unmarried parents are referred to as "single." Even when
"blended," contemporary families are typically conceived of
as nuclear, two-parent families different only in their
presence of non-biologically-related family members. These
understandings ignore the unique ways in which class, race,
and other aspects of identity combine to produce
fundamentally different family structures and caregiving
practices among a substantial portion of the population.
Even seemingly progressive family law reforms such as the
trend toward recognizing psychological parents, if limited to
those situations where the end result will be only two legal

50. See KATH WESTON, FAMILIES WE CHOOSE 2-3 (1991).

51. Gillian A. Dunne, Opting into Motherhood: Lesbians Blurring the
Boundaries and Transforming the Meaning of Parenthood and Kinship, 14
GENDER & SOC'Y 11, 25 (2000).
52. See, e.g., INST. FOR AM. VALUES, MARRIAGE AND THE LAW: A STATEMENT OF
PRINCIPLES 21 (2006).
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parents, are likely to come up short of their justice related
goals without more attention to these diverse cultural and
economic practices.
III. PROPOSALS
What insights do these examples suggest about how
legal feminists can better incorporate class into their
projects, taking an intersectional approach? This section
provides some preliminary thoughts, or rather, five
possible strategies.
1. Focus on theories and strategies that de-link the
delivery of economic benefits from historically status-laden
institutions. The examples provided in Parts I and II
represent logical strategies to allow previously excluded
individuals to enjoy the full economic benefits of the
workplace and the family, two major institutions in
American society that provide for economic dependency. For
example, looking to wage work as a promising route to
women's liberation (and all of the corresponding projects
that would enable that strategy) makes significant sense in
light of the fact that paid employment is a preferred source
of economic support in American society. Along the same
lines, legal feminist theories and strategies that seek to
preserve adequate alimony awards for women ensure that
women are able to benefit from the support function of the
family even after a formal marriage dissolves, just as child
support payments ensure the support function of the family
for children. And giving non-biological gay parents,
stepparents, and grandparents the formal legal status of
parent often provides children in "nontraditional" families
the economic benefit of two legal parents, even if
recognizing three or more adults as parents would better
reflect the social and economic relationships of many
families.
Finally,
the
federal
Employment
NonDiscrimination Act (ENDA)53 and same-sex marriage would
go a long way toward addressing sexuality and genderbased economic injustice, given that the workplace and the
family are the two core institutions for delivering economic

53. See, e.g., H.R. 2015, 110th Cong. (2007). ENDA provides employment
protections similar to those of Title VII, but specifically directed to gay, lesbian,
bisexual, and under some versions, transgender employees.
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benefits in our society. However, as essentially assimilatory
projects, these strategies fail to disrupt the designation of
the workplace and family as the institutions primarily
54
responsible for economic dependency in the first place.
Therefore, a legal feminist approach to economic
inequality, in addition to seeking a more fair distribution of
resources within the workplace and family, must also
attack the fundamental structure of the system itself. There
is no simple formula for doing this, except to say that any
theory or proposal should be evaluated on this basis. Some
examples that come closer on this measure than the
strategies discussed in Parts I and II include beefing up the
social welfare state along European lines, which would
broadly include the middle class in addition to the poor,
thereby giving everyone a stake in the system; universal
health insurance, which provides minimum health benefits
to all Americans regardless of their employment or marital
status; and civil union benefits for all individuals in
committed, economically interdependent relationships,
regardless of the sex of the parties, the number
of
individuals, or the sexual nature of the relationship. 55
2. Integrate the perspectives of other liberatory social
movements more deeply and thus make effective alliances.
This may seem too obvious to state, given that it is a core
methodological approach of feminism. However, for some of
the reasons stated in the introduction, there is a tendency
within legal feminism in particular not to take
antiessentialism seriously enough. 56 Where can we learn to
think more fully from the positions of others, 57 admittedly a
54. Although these four examples all fall into the category of equality-based
strategies, freedom-based strategies can have the same reinforcing effects. For
example, recognizing contracts for support and property between unmarried
cohabitants, as the California Supreme Court did in Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d
106, 116, 122 (Cal. 1976), also implicitly constructs intimate sexual
relationships as the preferred site of economic dependency.
55. For a thorough and clearly articulated account of this vision, perhaps
absent my expansive view on lifting numerosity limitations, see NANCY
POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER

THE LAW ch. 8 (2008).
56. See HALLEY, supra note 23, at 58-60.
57. See SANDRA HARDING, WHOSE SCIENCE? WHOSE KNOWLEDGE?: THINKING
FROM WOMEN'S LIVES 269-70 (1991); Maria Lugones, Playfulness, 'World"
Traveling, and Loving Perception, HYPATA, Summer 1987, at 3.
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difficult skill? In my opinion, critical race feminists and
critical race scholars more generally have gotten it right; in
particular, they know how to seriously incorporate race,
class, and gender into their analyses. 58 If legal feminists, or
left legal scholars more generally, want to learn how to
incorporate class into their work, they should read race
theory.
3. Do not concede the state as a significant potential
source of freedom and equality. Power today is largely
privatized
within
corporations,
nongovernmental
organizations, and markets more generally. Thus it seems
odd to argue, as we seem to hear everywhere (including
from many legal feminists, self-identified left legal
theorists, and in virtually every job talk I heard in 2007),
that markets are preferable to governments in distributing
resources, protecting rights, facilitating freedom, or
creating happiness. Concentrated power, wherever and
however it exists, is a problem. Certainly, we need to
develop context-specific strategies to deal with that.
Sometimes markets will be helpful and sometimes
governments will be; there are advantages and
disadvantages of each. But to define the state primarily as
the problem and markets primarily as the solution seems
not only naive, but downright dangerous in light of recent
neoliberal and fundamentalist religious attacks on
government. Legal feminists who argue that private
markets or private ordering are the best tools to break
down gender and sexuality-based hierarchies might
benefit from this insight.
4. Incorporate sociology within left legal theory and
legal reform projects, including legal feminism. Why
sociology? If we are to make any headway in addressing
class-based and other inequalities, we need more
structuralism, not less. Sociology provides an opportunity to
do that by combating the poststructuralist assumptions and
methodologies that have been imported into law through

58. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Differences
in Twentieth Century Race Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1923, 1927-28, 1998-2002
(2000); Berta Hernandez-Truyol, Angela Harris & Francisco Vald~s, Beyond the
First Decade: A Forward-Looking History of LatCrit Theory, Community and
Praxis, 17 LA RAZA L.J. 169, 192 (2006); Reginald C. Oh, Mapping a Materialist
LatCrit Discourse on Racism, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 243, 250-52 (2005).
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economics and literary theory. Sociology is helpful because
it reveals the ways that human behavior is influenced by
various structures. Sociology focuses on institutions and
society more generally, rather than on the atomized
individual or the nonhuman symbols with which
postmodern theory is largely concerned. 59 Sociology has a
long tradition of attention to social class, not as an
afterthought but as a main concern. Finally, sociologists
employ quantitative and qualitative methods that are
highly effective at revealing subtle but significant
differences within groups. These differences are potential
pay dirt for left legal theory of all kinds, including legal
feminism. On this last point, I will provide three examples.
a) Discourses within family law and legal feminism often
assume a monolithic experience of marriage and divorce.
However, research shows, for example, that marriage rates
are much lower and divorce rates are much higher among
low-income individuals and people of color. This information,
if taken to heart, should result in a significant re-orientation
away from marriage-based solutions to gender- and racebased economic inequality-for example, a more robust
social welfare state rather than divorce reform.
b) The idea that Americans face increasingly long work
hours is widely accepted in political discourse and legal
scholarship. Both legal feminists and employment law
scholars have devoted much attention to solving this
alleged problem. However, this is only true in the most
general sense. Although research shows that work hours
are increasing on average, this is occurring primarily
because individuals in certain sectors of the workforce are
working substantially more hours per week than thirty
years ago. 60 Longer workweeks are most common among
professionals and managers, married couples, and white
men. But less educated workers, nonprofessional workers,
and African-American men are working fewer hours per
week than in the past. The result has been a bifurcation of

59. See Martha Nussbaum, The Professorof Parody,NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 22,
1999, at 37-45.
60. This part is drawn largely from a discussion in Laura T. Kessler, The
Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, Women's Cultural
Caregiving,and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 371, 413 n.234 (2001).
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the workforce between overworked, full-time, salaried
employees and underemployed, part-time employees without
benefits. If legal scholars paid attention to these differences
among workers, a set of alternative agendas might emergefor example, job creation and on-site childcare for employees
with family responsibilities, rather than part-time work.
c) Although the prevailing stereotype of the same-sex
couple is the well-off "DINC" ("dual income no children"),
social science research and demographic data show that: (1)
gay men who work full-time earn as much as twenty-seven
percent less than heterosexual men; (2) the rate of home
ownership is lower for partnered gay and lesbian
households than for married heterosexual couples; (3)
lesbians earn about the same as straight women, but they
experience the same persistent wage discrimination as
straight women; (4) same-sex couples in the U.S. raising
children have lower median incomes than opposite sex
couples raising children; and (5) there exists widespread
employment discrimination61 against gay, lesbian, bisexual,
and transgendered people.
Despite these economic challenges, much queer theory
in law seems to embrace private, market-based solutions to
the status-based inequality of gay and lesbian people. For
example, scholars working in the area of sexuality and the
law have argued that a private market for gametes is
preferable to state regulation of alternative reproduction,
given the history of state-sponsored discrimination against
gay and lesbian families. 62 This is a valid point, but
perhaps the analysis might change somewhat if we
incorporated the social science data on class and sexual
orientation. The available routes to genetic parenthood are
prohibitively expensive for most gay men 63 and many
61. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF
THE CLOSET 125-32, 231-34 (1999); R. BRADLEY SEARS ET AL., THE WILLIAMS
PROJECT ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION LAW AND POLICY, UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW, SAMESEX COUPLES AND SAME-SEX COUPLES RAISING CHILDREN IN THE UNITED STATES

10-16 (2005); Dan Black et al., Demographics of the Gay and Lesbian Population
in the United States: Evidence from Available Systematic Data Sources, 37
DEMOGRAPHY 139, 140-41 (2000).

62. See Martha M. Ertman, What's Wrong with a Parenthood Market?: A
New and Improved Theory of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1, 21-26 (2003).
63. See Judith Stacey, Gay Parenthood and the Decline of Paternity as We
Knew It, 9 SEXUALITIES 27, 30 (2006).
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lesbians, 64 and there is significant discrimination in the
private market for gametes in any case for all gays and
lesbians. 65 From this perspective, ending discrimination with
regard to alternative reproduction, adoption, and foster
care-whether state or private-may be more pressing than
ensuring the continued operation of private gamete markets.
One has to read a lot of sociological studies to identify
major debates such as these. However, the payoff for legal
feminism and for left legal scholarship is potentially great.
Legal scholars concerned about class and structural
discrimination of all kinds should study sociology. And they
should mentor and recruit scholars trained in sociology,
rather than giving them up to the Law and Society
programs.

5. Begin an explicit conversation about the role of law
schools and legal education in devaluing class analysis in
legal feminism and other left legal projects. Here, I offer
several ideas for potential future exploration: (1) The new
focus on empirical scholarship within the legal academy
will privilege economic analysis absent a concerted effort to
incorporate a range of empirical methodologies; (2) The
continued segregation and devaluation of clinical legal
education, which historically has focused in large part on
poverty law, contributes to the devaluation of class analysis
within law; (3) The U.S. News ranking system, which favors
the admission of more economically privileged, white
students into law schools (and the undue reliance on the
LSAT more generally), are likely to have long-term negative
effects on justice-based movements and left legal theory; (4)
Left legal scholars doing some of the most powerful work
challenging the neoliberal juggernaut have not made their
way on to the faculties of the nation's most elite law schools
in significant numbers. Particularly since the late 1990s,
feminism in the most prestigious law schools has tended to
be shaped as cultural legal studies, a descendant of critical
legal studies that may be less threatening to the
neoliberallpatriarchal/white power center than many
strands of feminism, because it focuses less on material
harm and inequality, structures, institutions, and even

64. See Kessler, supra note 19, at 43 n.228.
65. Id. at 42 n.227.
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law. 66 More generally, job candidates who are doing
economic analyses of law and/or who tout market-based
solutions to various legal problems seem to dominate the
entry-level market for law school teaching jobs; (5) Finally,
massive resources are being directed toward legal
scholarship that is consistent with the neoliberal and
neoconservative agendas. 67 Unmasking and attacking these
systemic aspects of law schools and legal education that
disfavor robust class-based critique should be part of a
feminist agenda that takes class seriously.
CONCLUSION

In an effort to continue and build on the important and
exciting work of the ClassCrits project, in 2008 I coorganized a program for the Association of American Law
Schools' Section on Women in Legal Education titled
"Gender & Class: Voices from the Collective. ' 68 When we
sent the call for papers, there was a deluge of responses on
the section listserv, and it quickly became apparent that
the topic merited a full-day extended program. Ultimately,
the program featured an opening and closing plenary and
eight topical sessions: Children, Work, Care, Criminalization,
the State, National Security, Globalization, and the Family.
There were nearly fifty speakers. Our questions were: (1)
How can class be more fully incorporated into mainstream
legal analysis and political discourse on gender-based
inequality?; (2) How do economic class and economic
structures intersect with other forms of subordination, such
as race, gender, sexual orientation, disability? How do they
diverge?; (3) What are the challenges and complications
involved in bringing class analysis together with analyses of
66. On the commonalities between Law and Economics and Critical Legal
Studies, see Stanford Levinson, Strolling Down the Path of the Law (and
Toward Critical Legal Studies?): The Jurisprudence of Richard Posner, 91
CoLUM. L. REV. 1221, 1224-25, 1248-52 (1991) (book review). On the
commonalities between male supremacy and queer theory, see Marc
Spindelman, Sex Equality Panic, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 4-10 (2004).

67. See Martha T. McCluskey, Thinking with Wolves: Left Legal Theory
After the Right's Rise, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 1212-15 (2007) (book review).
68. The full committee was: Terri Beiner (University of Arkansas, Little
Rock), Laura Kessler (University of Utah), Ann McGinley (University of
Nevada, Las Vegas), Lisa Pruitt (University of California, Davis), Joan Vogel
(University of Vermont), and Rebecca Zietlow (University of Toledo).
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gender and other forms of subordination?; (4) Is class the
right concept for theorizing economic equality? 69 Productive
discourse on these larger questions and particular papers
characterized the day. Yet there was a significant sense
that we had only begun to scratch the surface. Among other
challenges, we lacked a shared vocabulary and definition of
class, and the emphases of the presenters on different
aspects of identity rendered the fragility of the whole affair
palpable.
This Essay similarly only begins to scratch the surface.
I have not defined class, interchangeably using class,
inequality, and poverty. Nor have I interrogated class as a
useful lens of analysis. For example, simply considering
class along with race, gender, and other axes of identity
may not go far enough to address the serious limitations of
traditional formal equality analysis. 70 I also have not
touched on the complications and tradeoffs involved in
bringing class analysis to the various feminist projects
identified. Finally, in highlighting what I believe are some
blind spots within legal feminism to class and economic
inequality, I have likely under-credited legal feminist
scholarship that is giving these areas critical attention.
Perhaps I have also under-credited the potentially classpositive implications even of the works I discuss. As an
initial exploration intended to initiate an admittedly
uncomfortable conversation about how a focus on class can
build on and add to feminist legal theory projects, I only
hope that these very tentative thoughts will bear fruit for
this exciting and ambitious project.

69. These questions largely tracked those of the ClassCrits project. They
also built on a conversation begun in May 2007 at Martha Fineman's Feminism
and Legal Theory Project workshop on Caste and Class at Emory Law School.
70. See Fineman, supra note 1, passim.

